Fair Value Settlement and the Difficulties
We focus on the procedure as applied by NYSE Liffe; Eurex applies a highly similar procedure, so the same arguments hold.
1 NYSE Liffe describes the procedures regarding how it adjusts derivatives contracts in response to various types of corporate actions -including stock splits, rights issues, and mergers and takeovers -in a document entitled "NYSE Liffe
Corporate Actions Policy". 2 
Fair Value Settlement
The first step in the case of mergers and takeovers is to determine whether and when the transaction initiates the fair value procedure. NYSE Liffe's Corporate Actions Policy states that adjustments to option contracts are made when a bid is declared unconditional and if the majority of the shares of the target company are acquired, that is, at least fifty percent plus one of the outstanding shares. 3 The acquiring firm's method of payment then determines the type of adjustment that applies. If the acquirer is paying in shares that constitute more than one third of the value of the offer and if these shares are or will be traded on the same exchange as the target's shares, then the outstanding options are normally replaced by options on the acquirer's shares through the so-called ratio method. In all other cases the fair value method is implemented.
The fair value method builds on the binomial tree model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979; henceforth CRR) . This appears to be the appropriate choice for this purpose over, for example, the Black and Scholes (1973) The second reason relates to timing and maturity effects.
Because there are normally several months between the announcement of the bid and the moment of settlement of the options after the offer is declared unconditional, there is a timing and maturity mismatch between implied volatility measurement and fair value settlement. The implied volatility of an option is, for example, measured five months before expiration and then used four months later to value the option at the settlement date when only one month of maturity remains. These mismatches are problematic because the slope of the term structure of implied volatilities is generally not flat and varies through time (Mixon, 2005) .
In addition, implied volatilities change stochastically and with mean reversion (Stein, 1989) . The hidden assumption of maturity-invariant and constant implied volatility disregards an important part of the dynamics, and means an inaccuracy in the fair value method. NYSE Liffe's choice to measure the implied volatilities over the ten days preceding the bid entails an additional problem, because price formation is typically contaminated by the event at that time. Implied volatilities on average increase significantly in advance of a transaction announcement (Jayaraman, Mandelker and Shastri, 1991; Levy and Yoder, 1993) . The use of contaminated pre-bid values leads to an additional overestimation of as-if volatility and an additional wealth transfer from writers to holders as compared to "clean" as-if settlement. This systematic bias can easily be avoided by using another estimation period, but in any case the precise estimates will remain subject to the (to some extent arbitrary) time window that is being used.
Other Methodological Issues
Although the main problems of the fair value method are related to the volatility estimates, the precise outcomes of fair value calculations also depend on how the expected dividends and the risk-free rate are determined.
For the expected dividends, NYSE Liffe uses the dividend forecasts of analysts at the commercial company Markit. The second argument is related to the law of one price.
Economically, and abstracting from imperfections such as tax effects, a successful cash offer for a company's shares is equal to a successful asset acquisition in cash (where the acquirer buys all the target's assets and liabilities rather than its shares). In the latter case, options are not settled andassuming the cash in the firm is not employed and ultimately available to shareholders -the implied volatilities are closely approximated by zero. In the spirit of the law of one price, it seems natural to preserve this similarity for options and align the settlement price after a stock acquisition with the value of the same option after the economically identical event of an asset acquisition. This value will normally not be very different from the intrinsic value. A first observation from the implied volatility figures concerns the patterns. Especially for the shorter-maturity options there is a clear U-shape pattern over the different strike prices. The fair value method assumes the stock price to be equal to the offer price but sets an option's volatility input equal to pre-announcement implied volatility. As a result, it ignores the implied-volatility effect of the large change in the moneyness of both calls and puts resulting from the takeover premium.
A second observation is the sensitivity of the implied volatilities to the choice of the ten-day measurement period.
Especially for the longer-maturity options, the alternative measurement periods generally yield substantially higher implied volatilities than the ten trading days preceding the announcement. Although the case of Océ apparently is not a good example of the more widely observed increase of implied volatilities in advance of a transaction announcement, it does show the sensitivity of the estimates to the time window that is being employed.
The final observation is the difference in both the level and the pattern of implied volatilities across different maturities.
Implied volatility is clearly maturity dependent, casting doubt on the accuracy of measuring a series' implied volatility multiple months prior to the actual valuation.
Conclusions
In the light of the fundamental and practical problems related to the current European practice of fair value settlement of stock options after a successful takeover bid,
we call for adoption of the intrinsic value method. The aim of the fair value method to compensate for foregone time value of prematurely expiring options is commendable but demands many subjective valuation choices that bring along complexity, arbitrariness and inaccuracy.
Moreover, the volatility inputs that are presently being used by exchanges are systematically biased relative to what would constitute a "fair" input, and correcting for this would make the method even more complex. Even though traded options are complete contracts whose value can always be theoretically determined, we believe that such difficulties are detrimental to market transparency and therefore preferably avoided. The intrinsic value method does not entail any of these problems, and, as we argued, there are grounds to claim that intrinsic values are fair settlement prices that reflect economic reality.
In fact, the average is taken over eight days as the highest and the lowest implied volatility observation are not taken into consideration.
5.
Hutson and Kearney (2001) argue that the lower implied volatility is a consequence of the convergence of opinions regarding the value of the target firm.
6.
The policy document does not spell out in detail how implied volatilities are calculated. Personal correspondence pointed out that NYSE Liffe uses the CRR model with a trinomial tree for this purpose. This is inconsistent with the binomial tree that is used to calculate the fair value of the option. Chan et al. (2009) illustrate that the choice of tree can have substantial effect on the pricing performance. Another issue is the number of steps in the tree. The exchange uses the number of days to maturity, with a maximum of 100. For options with a relatively low number of days to maturity, the corresponding low number of steps could induce noise in the estimated price; see Diener and Diener (2004) .
7.
Alternatives include a simulation approach that models the time-varying implied volatility surface and a crosssectional approach that uses the implied volatilities of similar firms.
8.
If the method of payment is stock instead of cash, the similarity across the two acquisition types holds automatically when the acquirer's shares will be traded on the target's exchange, as option trading is not terminated then (see Section II). Our law-of-one-price argument does not apply if the method of payment is stock and the acquirer's shares will not be traded on the target's exchange, as implied volatility is not approximated by zero in asset acquisitions then.
9.
An additional methodological choice that can be especially material for short maturities is the choice between the calendar time and the trading time approach. Our calculations point out that NYSE Liffe uses the number of days on the calendar as the time until expiration. This approach is at odds with studies indicating that trading days should be used (Fama, 1965; French, 1980; Roll, 1984; French and Roll, 1985) .
